

# Medieval Concepts of Jihad in the Interpretation of Salafi Preacher Abu Sufyan al-Sulami (1984–2017)

Vlada Bondarenko\* 

*Master's Student, National Research University Higher School of Economics – St. Petersburg (HSE University).*

*\*Corresponding Author Email: [vsbondarenko@edu.hse.ru](mailto:vsbondarenko@edu.hse.ru)*

## Abstract

This article examines the interpretation of medieval concepts of jihad in the discourse of the Salafi preacher Abu Sufyan al-Sulami (1984–2017), one of the leading ideologists of the terrorist organization known as the "Islamic State". Despite extensive historiography on the doctrine of jihad, the ideologies of individual preachers operating under the patronage of extremist organizations remain an underexplored area in contemporary scholarship. To date, no studies have compared al-Sulami's interpretations with the medieval sources he invokes, which constitutes the scholarly novelty of this research. The source base comprises written works, audio, and video materials in Arabic produced by al-Sulami in the course of his propaganda activities. Through qualitative discourse analysis, the main tenets of his concept of military jihad are reconstructed. A comparison with the treatises of Ibn Taymiyyah (1263–1328) and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah (1292–1350) reveals a number of fundamental discrepancies between the original positions of the medieval jurists and how their legacy is represented in al-Sulami's texts. In particular, the defensive nature of Ibn Taymiyyah's concept of jihad, formulated in the conditions of Mongol expansion and stipulating participation only when the capacity and means exist, is supplanted by an unconditional demand for offensive warfare. Ibn al-Qayyim's prohibitions against attacking civilians and against forced conversion to Islam are entirely ignored. The study demonstrates that the legitimization of violence in the Islamic State discourse is built not on the content of medieval treatises but on their systematic decontextualization and selective quotation, which transforms multilayered legal reasoning into a tool of mobilization.

**Keywords:** jihad, religious extremism, Islamic State, Abu Sufyan al-Sulami, Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah

## Introduction

In contemporary society, destructive movements of various orientations continue to gain traction, their values and objectives not always conforming to moral norms and, in some cases, contravening the provisions of international law. Among these, extremist groups of Islamist orientation occupy a particularly prominent place, their ideological doctrines drawing upon a selective and often distorted reading of the Islamic religious heritage. The terrorist activities of the organization known as the "Islamic State" (hereafter IS) have vividly demonstrated how extremist motivational discourse can transform religious concepts into instruments for the legitimization of violence.

Throughout the history of the Muslim ummah, jihad has occupied an important place in Islamic religious polemics. The concept is polysemantic, however, with the rise of Islamist terrorist organizations in the 20th and 21st centuries, it has come to be associated in public consciousness exclusively with politically motivated

violence (Bonner, 2006: 1). This reduction of meaning is largely attributable to the activities of extremist ideologists, who play a central role in the functioning of Islamist groups by fashioning their own interpretations of Islam. A key element of such interpretations is the concept of military jihad, through which ideologists, relying on selective readings of medieval jurists, recruit and mobilize volunteers for violent action. For this reason, it is essential to examine the mechanism by which medieval concepts of jihad are adapted by contemporary Islamist preachers, in order to expose false representations of the practice of jihad.

### **Materials and Methods**

This paper is based on a comprehensive analysis of primary sources produced by Abu Sufyan al-Sulami within the framework of his propaganda activities. The source base comprises three groups of materials. The first consists of al-Sulami's written texts, published under various pseudonyms, including pamphlets and instructional materials intended for IS recruit training (Al-Atharī, 2009; Al-Atharī, 2013; Al-Atharī, 2014; Al-Bin'alī, 2012; Al-Bin'alī, 2013; Al-Bin'alī, 2014; Al-Bin'alī, 2015a; Al-Bin'alī, 2015b; Al-Bin'alī, 2015c; Al-Bin'alī, 2015d). The second group comprises audio and video recordings of al-Sulami's lectures from the Archive.org platform (Al-Bin'alī, n.d.-a; Al-Bin'alī, n.d.-b; Al-Sulamī, n.d.). The third group encompasses medieval primary sources: the treatises of Ibn Taymiyyah (1995; 2002) and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah (1997; 2008).

The study employs general scholarly research methods as well as qualitative discourse analysis, which enabled a close examination of al-Sulami's source materials and the identification of the key tenets of his concept of military jihad. The comparative method made it possible to juxtapose al-Sulami's interpretation of jihad with the original concepts of Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah.

#### ***Jihad: Conceptual Framework of the Study***

The doctrinal content of the concept of jihad has undergone transformation in response to the historical circumstances in which the Muslim ummah developed. Jurists contributed to the elaboration of this doctrine in order to confront both external and internal threats. In the early period, in accordance with the Meccan suras, jihad served primarily as a moral and religious guide (Levin, 2014: 98). The military campaigns of the Prophet Muhammad significantly influenced the application of jihad in the context of conquest (Afsaruddin, 2013: 35). During the Umayyad (661–750) and Abbasid (750–1258) caliphates, the doctrine underwent substantial changes – from active deployment to a decline in significance (Blankinship, 1994: 1). Two watershed periods played a particularly important role in shaping the theory of jihad: the Crusader incursions of the 11th–13th centuries (Bonner, 2006: 143) and Western colonialism of the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Peters, 1980: 135). In the modern era, the doctrine of jihad acquired a new dimension in the context of Islamist terrorist organizations, which adapted it to justify politically motivated violence (Bunt, 2003). Specifically, fragments of legal reasoning, extracted from their textual and historical context, are presented as universal directives, thereby reducing a multilayered concept to a single-function mobilization slogan.

#### ***Abu Sufyan al-Sulami: A Biographical Sketch***

Abu Sufyan al-Sulami was a Salafi preacher belonging to the Salafi-jihadist faction. He was a high-ranking member of IS who made a significant contribution to the formation of the organization's ideological foundation. The preacher's real name was Turki ibn Mubarak al-Bin'ali, though he was also known under the following pseudonyms: Abu Human Bakr ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Athari, Abu Hazm al-Salafi, Abu Hudhayfah al-Bahrayni, Abu Khuzayma al-Mudari, and Abu Dirgham (Al-Bin'alī, 2014: 3). Al-Sulami was born on September 3, 1984, in al-Muharrag (Bahrain), into a family reportedly connected to the ruling Al Khalifa dynasty (Counter Extremism Project, n.d.). He received his initial religious education in Bahrain, continued his studies in the UAE, and completed them in Beirut (al-Gharīb, n.d.: 3). Particularly formative for al-Sulami's worldview was his study under several scholars, including 'Abdullah ibn 'Abd al-Rahman ibn Jibrin (1933–2009) and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (b. 1959) (Al-Sulamī, 2014: 2). He subsequently entered into open religious polemics with many of his former mentors.

In late 2013, al-Sulami joined IS in Syria, assuming the position of religious advisor (Counter Extremism Project, n.d.). He laid the foundation for the organization's media propaganda, producing a large volume of propaganda materials: video lectures, audio recordings, pamphlets, and books justifying violence against Yazidis, Christians, and Shi'a Muslims. Among his most notable works are an apologia for IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Al-Atharī, 2013) and a "catechism" for extremist training camps (Al-Bin'alī, 2015d). Al-Bin'ali was also involved in recruiting: in 2013 and 2015, al-Baghdadi dispatched him to Libya for propaganda activities (Letter, 2015: 8). During the ideologist's membership in IS, an internal rift emerged, which ultimately led to his death as a result of US-led coalition airstrikes on May 31, 2017, in al-Mayadin, Syria (Centcom, n.d.).

### ***The Concept of Military Jihad in Abu Sufyan al-Sulami's Interpretation***

Discourse analysis of al-Sulami's works reveals the following key tenets of his concept of military jihad. The ideologist emphasizes the oneness of God and opposes all manifestations of polytheism (Al-Atharī, 2014: 6), maintaining that a true understanding of Islam can be achieved only through the Qur'an and the Sunnah in accordance with the understanding of the righteous predecessors (*al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ*) (Al-Sulamī, n.d.). He asserts the necessity of establishing a unified caliphate in which all people would follow Islam and orient themselves toward the way of life of the early Muslim community (Al-Bin'alī, 2015b: 4). The ideologist further considers the use of any means to create such a state permissible, including violent ones. Al-Sulami categorically rejects existing political regimes, asserting that people who support them "live in darkness and delusion" (Al-Bin'alī, 2013: 4).

Citing the varying character of the Qur'anic suras of the Meccan and Medinan periods, the preacher claims that the current stage of societal development is comparable to the Medinan suras (Al-Bin'alī, 2015a: 6). Al-Sulami emphasizes that the ruling on combat and jihad adopted in the Medinan period abrogates the prescriptions of forgiveness and mercy (Al-Atharī, 2009: 13). In his view, military jihad against "unbelievers" is a necessity for Muslims, because "the entire religion must belong entirely to Allah" (Al-Atharī, 2014: 9). Based on these premises, al-Sulami adhered to a rigid interpretation of jihad that justifies violence against various religious and confessional groups corresponding to his category of "unbelievers". The extreme aggressiveness of his position is manifested, for example, in the assertion of the permissibility of enslaving "unbelieving" women and children (Al-Bin'alī, 2015c: 7).

For al-Sulami, military jihad constitutes an essential component of religious teaching (Al-Bin'alī, 2015a: 9). The ideologist decrees that the renewal of religion and the revival of the true teaching of Allah are possible only through jihad and armed struggle against "apostates" and "unbelievers" (Al-Bin'alī, 2015d). Accordingly, al-Sulami advocates an expansionist, offensive jihad aimed at conquering territory for the establishment of an Islamic caliphate (Al-Bin'alī, n.d.-b). He regards military jihad as a religious obligation of all Muslims and calls upon them to join IS's global struggle against "unbelievers".

To motivate recruits, al-Sulami proclaims jihad an individual obligation (*farḍ al-'ayn*) of every believer. Citing medieval jurists, the preacher concludes that jihad constitutes a collective obligation (*farḍ al-kifāyah*), however, in the event that enemies invade Muslim territory or an "apostate ruler" holds power, it becomes an individual obligation of all Muslims (Al-Bin'alī, 2015a: 4). He emphasizes that the majority of Muslim countries are governed by "unbelieving" rulers, and therefore, in the present day, jihad can be interpreted exclusively as an individual obligation. It is important to note that for al-Sulami, jihad is an intrinsically valuable act of worship (Al-Bin'alī, 2015a: 2), which further confirms his interpretation of jihad as a predominantly personal duty.

The phenomenon of martyrdom occupies a special place in al-Sulami's discourse. The preacher calls upon his followers, whom he terms "*mujāhidīn*", to combat apostasy and the "deceptive mirage of imitating the unbelieving West and the people of immorality, unbelief, and heresy" (Al-Atharī, 2014: 1). He emphasizes the exceptionalism of his supporters and compares them to the first companions of the Prophet Muhammad (Al-Atharī, 2014: 15). In this context, the ideologist raises the question of suicide terrorist attacks, which has remained a subject of vigorous debate among jurists since the medieval period. To justify such activities, al-Sulami draws a comparison between suicide bombers and bees that sacrifice their lives for defense (Al-Bin'alī, 2012: 8). To support his position, al-Sulami notes that, according to some jurists, suicide is "the killing of oneself in a state of anger, frustration, or fear" (Al-Bin'alī, 2012: 11) and is prohibited, however, such a manner of death has nothing in common with "martyrdom operations." Furthermore, al-Sulami asserts that prohibiting such operations on the grounds that no analogous precedents existed during the time of the Prophet Muhammad is tantamount to prohibiting the use of modern weaponry that did not exist during the Prophet's lifetime (Al-Bin'alī, 2012: 30).

It can be stated that the preacher systematically disregarded the norms of fiqh regulating the practice of jihad – in particular, the prohibition against attacking civilians and the use of disproportionate force. Believing that he had no restrictions on his choice of weapons or military tactics, he obligated Muslims to participate in offensive jihad against all whom he classified as "unbelievers" and called upon his followers to carry out inhumane acts, including suicide terrorist operations. These calls were reinforced by selective references to the Qur'an and the Sunnah, through which the ideologist was able to formulate religious justifications for any IS action.

### ***Comparison of al-Sulami's Concept with the Positions of Ibn Taymiyyah***

Ibn Taymiyyah was a prominent Muslim theologian of the Hanbali school of jurisprudence, widely regarded as one of the architects of the theoretical foundations of Salafism. The jurist's works are extensively cited by representatives of Islamist terrorist organizations, making him one of the medieval Muslim jurists most frequently invoked by jihadists (Nesser, 2011: 179). Al-Sulami regularly drew upon the works of Ibn Taymiyyah and devoted a separate lecture series to explicating the theological positions set forth in his treatises

(Al-Bin'alī, n.d.-a). However, the comparative analysis conducted in this study reveals a number of significant discrepancies between Ibn Taymiyyah's original positions on the practice of jihad and how his legacy is reproduced in al-Sulami's texts.

Against the backdrop of the Mongol expansion into the Abbasid Caliphate, Ibn Taymiyyah sought to motivate Muslims to resist the invaders. The task was complicated by the fact that the Mongols had formally adopted Islam by the 13th century, making the declaration of jihad against them legally problematic. Ibn Taymiyyah's solution was to justify the legitimacy of the struggle through the adversary's non-observance of Sharia norms. Thus, for the medieval jurist, jihad was fundamentally a defensive doctrine, through which the protection of the Sunni community from heresy and innovations on the part of "unbelievers" could be ensured (Hillenbrand, 1999). Al-Sulami, by contrast, interprets jihad as an offensive practice whose ultimate goal is the establishment of a unified caliphate. The IS ideologist transposes medieval discourse onto the contemporary context, employing Ibn Taymiyyah's rulings to foment inter-confessional discord (Al-Bin'alī, 2015d).

Citing Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Sulami decrees that in the event of an enemy invasion of Muslim territory, jihad becomes a personal obligation of every Muslim (Al-Bin'alī, 2015a: 5). However, this reference is incomplete and distorted: the medieval jurist stipulated that participation in defensive jihad depended on 'the availability of means and strength' (Ibn Taymiyyah, 1995: 442), which fundamentally differs from al-Sulami's unconditional summons.

Another significant area of divergence concerns the question of martyrdom missions. In examining martyrdom in the context of defending the ummah, Ibn Taymiyyah referred to the practice of *inghmās* – an unconventional combat tactic in which a single Muslim or a small group engages a significantly larger enemy force. In the medieval jurist's view, this form of combat presupposes the possibility of the warriors' survival (Ibn Taymiyyah, 2002: 65), and thus differs fundamentally from contemporary methods of carrying out "martyrdom", which by definition entail the death of the perpetrator. Nevertheless, the preacher invoked the medieval jurist's rulings to justify terrorist acts (Al-Bin'alī, 2012: 15), which attests to a deliberate distortion of the medieval jurist's original ideas.

#### ***Comparison of al-Sulami's Concept with the Positions of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah***

Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah was the most renowned student and associate of Ibn Taymiyyah, who developed and elaborated upon his teacher's works. Al-Sulami cites Ibn al-Qayyim less frequently than Ibn Taymiyyah, yet he similarly employs his works selectively to support his own conception.

Appealing to Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Sulami asserts that since the prescription for military action was established in the second year of the Hijra – that is, considerably earlier than the obligatory Hajj – military jihad possesses no lesser legal standing than other forms of worship (Al-Atharī, 2009: 25). From this, the preacher draws a polemical conclusion addressed to contemporary jurists: "Why do you not say: today there is no zakat, no fasting, no Hajj! As you say: today there is no jihad!" (Al-Atharī, 2009: 25). In so doing, al-Sulami seeks to place military jihad on an equal footing with the pillars of Islam and to present it as an irrevocable obligation of every Muslim. However, Ibn al-Qayyim himself did not directly address the question of legalizing military jihad in such terms. Al-Sulami extracted a chronological detail from the medieval text and embedded it within his own argument, endowing it with a meaning absent from the original.

The extremist preacher also invokes the texts of Ibn al-Qayyim to incite the killing of adherents of other confessional currents. Citing the medieval jurist, he presents the struggle against non-Muslims as one of the manifestations of Islam: "Faith cannot be realized except through the manifestation of enmity toward these opponents, hatred of them and their people, hostility toward them, and the waging of war against them" (Al-Bin'alī, 2015d: 4). At the same time, Ibn al-Qayyim, like Ibn Taymiyyah, did not regard military jihad as an instrument of offensive warfare, explicitly stipulating its defensive character. In his treatise, he writes: "...and since killing is obligatory only under conditions of armed confrontation, but not in the case of opposition to unbelief, therefore women, children, the elderly, the blind, and monks who do not fight are not to be killed. Rather, we fight those who wage war against us" (Ibn Qayyim, 1997: 110). Thus, Ibn al-Qayyim's position held that military jihad is a practice directed against hostility, not against religious affiliation.

Al-Sulami also turns to the works of Ibn al-Qayyim in his treatise justifying slavery, where he legitimizes the capture of "unbelieving" women and children in the course of offensive jihad and their forced conversion to Islam (Al-Bin'alī, 2015c: 7). However, such a reference lacks a genuine basis, as Ibn al-Qayyim rejected forced conversion to Islam (Ibn Qayyim, 2008: 12).

Thus, al-Sulami systematically invokes the legacy of Ibn al-Qayyim to legitimize attacks on civilians, violence against the innocent, and forced religious conversion. However, all such references are fragmentary in nature and find no corroboration in the original treatises of Ibn al-Qayyim, whose positions al-Sulami reproduces selectively and outside their original context.

## Conclusion

In public consciousness, the concept of jihad has come to be associated exclusively with the activities of the terrorist groups, leading to its stigmatization and trivialization. Meanwhile, jihad should be understood as a flexible doctrine that evolved in response to the circumstances faced by the Muslim community at various stages of its development. Given the historical background of jihad's formation and its capacity for transformation, it is impossible to examine this phenomenon objectively using essentialist terms.

Analysis of al-Sulami's biography has revealed his deep involvement in the ideological and propaganda activities of IS. The characterization of the concept of jihad by this extremist ideologist has demonstrated its radically offensive nature. The preacher proclaimed military jihad an individual obligation of every Muslim, justified terror, the enslavement of adherents of other religions, and legitimized suicide terrorist attacks. The most frequently cited sources in his works devoted to the practice of military jihad are excerpts from the treatises of Ibn Taymiyyah and his student Ibn al-Qayyim. Comparison of al-Sulami's concept of jihad with the medieval concepts has revealed a number of discrepancies that reflect the generally sophistic character of the young preacher's ideas. With respect to Ibn Taymiyyah, it has been established that: (a) the extremist preacher substitutes an offensive conception of jihad for the original defensive one; (b) al-Sulami disregards the jurist's caveat regarding the necessity of possessing the capacity and means for participation in jihad; (c) he equates contemporary suicide operations with the medieval practice of *inghmās*, which differs fundamentally in that it presupposes the possibility of survival. With respect to the legacy of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, it has been found that: (a) al-Sulami arbitrarily embeds fragments of the medieval scholar's reasoning into his own extremist conclusions; (b) he disregards Ibn al-Qayyim's clear stipulation of the defensive character of jihad and the prohibition against attacking civilians; (c) he ignores Ibn al-Qayyim's position on the impermissibility of forced conversion to Islam.

Abu Sufyan al-Sulami, drawing upon the works of Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn al-Qayyim for the purpose of providing religious grounding for his extremist views, fashioned a religious foundation for the justification of violent acts and terror. The analysis conducted permits the conclusion that al-Sulami formulated his own concept of military jihad, characterized by three key strategies for manipulating the medieval heritage: decontextualization, selective quotation, and deliberate distortion of original positions.

## References

- Afsaruddin, A. (2013). *Striving in the Path of God: Jihad and Martyrdom in Islamic Thought*. New York: Oxford University Press. [[Google Scholar](#)] [[Publisher](#)]
- Al-Atharī, 'Abd al-'Azīz. (2009). *Al-nawāfiḥ al-miskīyah fī naqsh shubhat al-marḥalah al-makkīyah* [Fragrant Reflections on Refuting the Misconception of the Meccan Phase]. [S. 1.]: Minbar al-tawḥīd wa'l-jihād. (in Arabic) [[Publisher](#)]
- Al-Atharī, 'Abd al-'Azīz. (2013). *Mudd al-ayādī li-bay'at al-Baghdādī* [Extend Hands for the Pledge to al-Baghdadī]. [S. 1.]: Minbar al-tawḥīd wa'l-jihād. (in Arabic) [[Publisher](#)]
- Al-Atharī, 'Abd al-'Azīz. (2014). *Wa'd Allāh. Nuṣrat li-mujāhidī Dawlat al-Islām fī al-'Irāq wa-al-Shām* [God's Promise: Support for the Mujahidīn of the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham]. [S. 1.]: al-Ghurabā' li'l-'ilām. (in Arabic) [[Publisher](#)]
- Al-Bin'alī, Turkī. (2012). *Al-aqwāl al-mahdīyah ilā al-'amalīyāt al-istishhādīyah* [The Mahdī's Sayings on "Martyrdom Operations"]. [S. 1.]: Minbar al-tawḥīd wa'l-jihād. (in Arabic) [[Publisher](#)]
- Al-Bin'alī, Turkī. (2013). *Kātulūj al-ḥayāt* [Catalogue of Life]. [S. 1.]: Minbar al-tawḥīd wa'l-jihād. (in Arabic) [[Publisher](#)]
- Al-Bin'alī, Turkī. (2014). *Zubālat al-milal wa'l-niḥal* [The Trash of Religions and Sects]. [S. 1.]: Arḍ al-Shām. (in Arabic) [[Publisher](#)]
- Al-Bin'alī, Turkī. (2015a). *Al-qandīl fī radd al-abāṭīl* [The Light of Truth in Response to Vanity]. [S. 1.]: al-Wafā'. (in Arabic) [[Publisher](#)]
- Al-Bin'alī, Turkī. (2015b). *Al-Sharī'ah ḥayāt* [Sharia Is Life]. [S. 1.]: al-Wafā'. (in Arabic) [[Publisher](#)]
- Al-Bin'alī, Turkī. (2015c). *Min ḥukm al-khallāq fī al-saby wa'l-istirqāq* [On Captivity and Enslavement: A Ruling]. *Al-dawlah al-Islāmīyah Haī'ah al-Buḥūth wa'l-Iftā'*. (in Arabic) [[Publisher](#)]
- Al-Bin'alī, Turkī. (2015d). *Muqarrar fī al-tawḥīd li'l-mu'askarāt* [A Tawhid Course for Military Camps]. [S. 1.]: *Al-dawlah al-Islāmīyah Haī'ah al-Buḥūth wa'l-Iftā'*. (in Arabic) [[Publisher](#)]
- Al-Bin'alī, Turkī. (n.d.-a). *Sharḥ Lāmīyat Shaykh Ibn Taymīyah fī al-'aqīdah* [Commentary on "Lāmīyat Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymīyah" on Creed] [Audio recording]. (in Arabic) [[Publisher](#)]
- Al-Bin'alī, Turkī. (n.d.-b). *Faḍā'il al-jihād* [Benefits of Jihad] [Audio recording]. (in Arabic) [[Publisher](#)]
- Al-Gharīb, Abū Usāmah. (n.d.). *Al-Mukhtaṣar al-Jalī bi-sīrat Shaykhinā Turkī al-Bin'alī* [A Brief Exposition of the Biography of Our Shaykh Turki al-Bin'ali]. [S. 1.]: s. n.]. (in Arabic) [[Publisher](#)]
- Al-Jawziyyah, Ibn Qayyim. (1997). *Aḥkām ahl al-dhimmah* [Rulings on the People of the Dhimma]. Al-

- Dammām: Ramādī li'l-nashr. (in Arabic) [\[Publisher\]](#)
- Al-Jawzīyah, Ibn Qayyim. (2008). *Hidāyat al-ḥayārā fī ajwibat al-Yahūd wa'l-Naşārā* [Guidance of the Perplexed in Answers to the Jews and Christians]. Makkah: Dār 'Ālam al-Fawā'id li'l-nashr wa'l-tawzī'. (in Arabic) [\[Publisher\]](#)
- Al-Sulamī, Abū Sufyān. (2014). *Al-tarjamah al-'ilmīyah li'l-Shaykh al-mujāhid Turkī ibn Mubārak al-Bin'alī* [Academic Biography of Shaykh-Mujahid Turki ibn Mubarak al-Bin'ali]. [S. 1.]: Mu'assasat al-Battār al-i'lāmīyah. (in Arabic) [\[Publisher\]](#)
- Al-Sulamī, Abū Sufyān. (n.d.). *Al-tawḥīd wā'l-ḥarbah* [Tawhid and War] [Video recording]. (in Arabic) [\[Publisher\]](#)
- Blankinship, K. (1994). *The End of the Jihad State: The Reign of Hisham Ibn 'Abd al-Malik and the Collapse of the Umayyads*. New York: State University of New York Press. [\[Google Scholar\]](#) [\[Publisher\]](#)
- Bonner, M. (2006). *Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practice*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. [\[Google Scholar\]](#) [\[Publisher\]](#)
- Bunt, G. (2003). *Islam in the Digital Age: E-Jihad, Online Fatwas and Cyber Islamic Environments*. London: Pluto Press. [\[Google Scholar\]](#) [\[Publisher\]](#)
- Centcom. (n.d.). *Coalition forces killed Turki al-Bin'ali* [\[Publisher\]](#)
- Counter Extremism Project. (n.d.). *Turki al-Binali* [\[Publisher\]](#)
- Hillenbrand, C. (1999). *The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. [\[Google Scholar\]](#) [\[Publisher\]](#)
- Ibn Taymiyyah. (1995). *Majmū' al-fatāwā* [Collection of fatwas]. Vol. 4. Al-Madīnah: Majma' al-Malik Fahd. (in Arabic). [\[Publisher\]](#)
- Ibn Taymiyyah. (2002). *Qā'idat fī al-inghmās fī al-'aduww wa-hal yubāḥ* [A principle regarding plunging into the enemy and whether it is permissible]. Al-Riyād: Aḍwā' al-Salaf. (in Arabic) [\[Publisher\]](#)
- Letter dated 18 November 2015 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council. (2015). New York: United Nations. [\[Publisher\]](#)
- Levin, Z. I. (2014). *Ocherki prirody islamizma* [Essays on the nature of Islamism]. Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences. (in Russian). [\[Publisher\]](#)
- Nesser, P. (2011). Ideologies of Jihad in Europe. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 23(2), 173–200. [\[Google Scholar\]](#) [\[Publisher\]](#)
- Peters, R. (1980). *Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History*. The Hague: De Gruyter Mouton. [\[Google Scholar\]](#) [\[Publisher\]](#)