

The Effective Global Trends and Contexts on New Developmental State Emerging compare to Iran, Malaysia, Turkey and Brazil

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Abstract: Developmental State and its emerging is one of the most valuable approaches in developmental studies. This type of states has changed in several historical event including, emerging Classic Developmental State in Germany and Japan (1870-1914), creating to Bureaucratic Developmental State in East Asia after World War II, and transferring of developmental state model to other developing countries e.g. Middle East, Africa and Latin America (*New Developmental State*), after 1990s related to change in global socio-economic environment and the end of Cold War. The emerging of *New Developmental State* is the most recent trend in developmental states. To proving this claim, we construct *New Developmental State* as ideal type and compare features this type of states between Brazil, Malaysia, Turkey and Iran with comparative-historical method. According to findings of this research, the emerging of some new developmental states embedded in the situations like the changing in the environment of global economy, vanishing the cold war, and feeling a pressure toward democratization.

Keywords: State, Developmental State (DS), Features, Transferability, New Developmental State (NDS).

Introduction

Since the late 1970s, a number of social scientists have paid attention to centralized state power in capitalist societies and state autonomy theories (Skocpol, 1979; Giddens, 1985; Mann, 1986). Developmental states have evolved around some specific historical events during 1870s decade, including two historical trends: The Prussian Empire Conquest over Napoleon III, and the beginning of Meiji Reforms in Japan (Kazemi, 2015). Through the elimination of development obstacles, Bismarck and Meiji states (classic developmental states) -as two typical examples of this developmental model- established the related infrastructures and context of national development, something that in Moore parlance is so-called "revolution from above" (Moore, 1993).

The aftermath of World War II, formation of Eastern Bloc, and finally, beginning the Cold War, all together, transferred the geographical field of developmental states to the East Asia (Kazemi, 2015) that in its turn created central core of developmental state in this region. The transferring of Developmental states model to the other developing countries in the Middle east, Africa and Latin America, is the concrete evidence for the emerging of some *new developmental states* embedded in the situations like the changing in the environment of global economy, vanishing the cold war, and feeling a pressure toward democratization (a race to the bottom).

Expansion of developmental state in new regions of developing world, Represent possibility of "semi-peripheral development". Especially, the global socio-economic trend after 1990s increased geographical scope and functional differentiation of developmental states. In this research, we will prove that transferring

developmental state model¹ to Middle east, Africa and Latin America (e.g Brazil and Turkey), as representative of the most recent formations of semi-peripheral development.

Conceptualization of new developmental state and Its features

One can traces the ideas related to the developmental states in some scholar's works who have the reputation in classic economic history (List, 1841; Gerschenkron, 1962; Marx, 1979) and, especially, in institutional economy and sociology (Johnson, 1982; Evans, 1995; 2010, Leftwich, 2000, Kohli, 2004; Routley, 2012; Amsden, 1992; Wade, 1990; Wong, 2004; Block, 2007).

The elaboration and outlining of the notions of aforementioned scholars(See: table 1) is a suitable analytic tool putting the light on the new developmental states in some manners as follow:

Table 1. notions and typologies of developmental states.

Study	typologies of developmental states	Summary of findings and conclusions
Johnson, 1982	Developmental state Programmer state	The <i>Johnson,s</i> book is one of the first works to utilise the term developmental state. Japan is seen to be a developmental state, employing a particular set of state – business and continuing a powerful beurucracy. developmental state is differentiated from programmer state in economic-idelological centers in Soviet Union.
Evans, 1995, 2010	Developmental state Intermediate State Predatory State	Examination of role of the state in industrial growth especially through an examination of the Information Technology (IT) Industry. The case studies are drawn from New Industrialising Countries and comprise Brazil, India(Intermediate State) and Korea (Developmental state) during the 1970s and 1980s. Evans Intermediate State confirms 21th that 21th century developmental state (“Capability-Expanding State” (Evans, 2010)) is versatile to implications of globalisation.
Leftwich, 2000	Developmental state Non-developmental state	<i>Leftwich</i> beleives the emergence of developmental state is, with few exceptions such as Botswana , unique experience of east asia(sigapore, south korea). On the other hand, Non-developmental state narrates the historical experiences of failed states in Africa after World War II.
Kohli, 2004	Neo-patrimonial state Cohesive-capitalist state Fragmented-multi class state	Kohli concludes that the type of state formed during the period of state formation (significantly in the examples examined often in a colonial context) is a key element in explaining the way in which states subsequently are able to act as economic agents. With consideration to the above phrases and the differing conditions that face states and the exigencies of the global economic context, Nigeria is a Neo-patrimonial state with a disfigured bureaucracy, while a Cohesive-capitalist state(south korea)and a Fragmented-multi class stat (brazil) have to adequate and efficient beurucracies.
Routley,	Social developmental state	Social developmental state consist of

¹ Johnson (1982) defined Japenness developmental state as a state that is focused on economic development and takes necessary policy measures to accomplish that objective. According to deffinition there isn't substantive differences between New Developmental states and central core of East Asia. There are, only, formal differences between them such as the form of government(authoritarian/democratic) and the type of beurucracy. Fore example, new states more committed to the exercise of democracy and differs from Weberian organized bureaucracy. This type of state is already defined and investigated in view of thinkers, such as Routley (2012) and Garcia (2013) from a different ways.

2012	Patrimonial developmental state	developmental welfare states(Scandinavian) and social democratic developmental state(South Africa). On the other hand, Patrimonial developmental state(Kenya, Malawi and Côte d'Ivoire) despite similarise with east asian developmental states, is differentiated with them in traits such as clientelism and patrimonialism.
Sandbrook et al., 2007	developmental welfare state	The book concludes that the possibilities for the emergence of an economically successful social democratic state in the global periphery centres on the class formation of states and whether this predisposes them to pursue equitable development. also highlight that these successful states (developmental welfare state such as Scandinavian) manage this incorporation and ameliorate its negative consequences in a manner which attracts capital to invest and emphasis to social protection.
Rodrik, 2004; Gumedé, 2011; Klay Kieh Jr, 2015	Social democratic developmental state	Social democratic developmental state is show case of development experience in Africa(South Africa, Mauritania), Latin America(Brazil), and middle east(Turkey). This experice is confirmed that among new developmental state with different geographic origin from East Asia, democracy is embedded to economic relations and powery decline.
Chang, 2010	Developmental authoritarian state Developmental welfare state Developmental network state	South korea, singapore and taiwan are showcases the Developmental authoritarian state. On the other hand, US from the end of world war(as opposed to 'developmental bureaucratic state' of East Asian kind) is a Developmental network state.
Bolesta, 2012	Post-Socialist Developmental State	The end of cold war and the collapse of socialist regimes, are constructive factors fore Post-Socialist Developmental State in modern China.This model is a post-cold war strategy for former socialist countries.
Wong, 2004	Adaptive Developmental State	Exogenous Economic Pressures such as The end of the Cold War, the onset of economic globalization, and positive trends toward democratic deepening in Asia are predisposing factors for Adaptive Developmental State(Japan, South Korea).
Kim, 2007	Post-developmental State Market-oriented	The East Asian states such as taiwan and south korea have recognized that their national systems of economic development have declined. They have in fact witnessed a transition to post-developmental market-oriented states established rules governing the market economy and abolishing government regulation.
Block, 2007	'hidden' developmental state	during the post-WWII period, the US has had a developmental state that is 'hidden'. Block argues that the US has had a very strong 'developmental network state', which is focused on translating cutting-edge technological research into commercial use through cooperation among a network of people with high levels of technological expertise – variously situated in state agencies, industries, universities, and other research institutes.

Crossing of East Asian stereotypical image as unique experience of developmental states

This statement is based upon emerging developmental network state in US (Block, 2007; Chang, 2010) and Ireland (Ó Riain, 2001) as other geographical regions of developmental states in North America and West Europe (see: table 1). As Block highlights developmental network state has had a major impact on the structure of the U.S. national innovation system, during the post-WWII period, and technological researches transferring to commercial users and entrepreneurs. Although different political and economic conditions made the US developmental state very different from the 'east asian' ones, the existence of this hidden developmental state (after 1980s) has important political implications both domestically and internationally. The international implications are immediately apparent, but the domestic implications are potentially transformative and could ultimately have deep global ramifications. Ó Riain (2001) argues Ireland (after 1990s) as Flexible Developmental State nurtures Post-Fordist networks of production and innovation, attracts international investment and promotes development by linking these local and global technology and business networks. This is made possible by the multiple embeddednesses of state agencies in professional-led networks of innovation and in international capital and by the state's flexible organizational structure. So unlike conventional wisdom, developmental state not only is the matter of –Johnson (1982) and Leftwich (2000) has considered developmental states as specific beings cross-linked with geopolitical, cultural and historical in east asia-developing world, but also is the matter of developed world.

Considering the variable environment of the global economy as an international structural status

global economic environment as a international structural status has changed formation of developmental states in two recent decades. As state-oriented theorists believed that global environment, with linkage states to international markets, has created social developmental state (Routley, 2012; Sandbrook et al., 2007) and capability-expanding state (Evans, 2010). Globalization as the most important exogenous pressure plus endogenous pressures such as demographic changes and democratization trend, have added Africa, Middle East and Latin America states such as South Africa (Gumede, 2011; Klay Kieh Jr, 2015), Turkey (Rodrik, 2004), Brazil (Garcia, 2013).

Transferability of developmental states. i.e. the diffusion of these states to the other regions of the developing world

This statement is explained with following chief arguments. First, geopolitical position of developmental states is transferred to other geographical regions beyond east asia. Insofar as according to international developmental structures, we can claim that non-colony modern states in Middle East such as Turkey, former colonies in "global South" e.g South Africa and Latin American emerging economies e.g Brazil are new options of developmental states. On the other hand, the collapse of socialist regimes is created a different condition for theorizing of developmental states. As Bolesta (2012) argues China's post-socialist development trajectory has been determined by the provisions of the Developmental State (DS) model, as far as state development policies, state ideology, and state institutional arrangements are concerned, and to the extent, that China has become a genus of the Post-Socialist Developmental State (PSDS) model – this model being an alternative to the post-socialist neo liberalism between socialist countries of former Soviet satellites such as Poland.

The social origins of developmental states

Since social origins of developmental states is important that democratic values and social protection are embedded in new developmental states. As tracing development path in African social democratic states (See: Gumede, 2011; Klay Kieh Jr, 2015) such as South Africa and Mauritania, we find democratic values not only is preferred rather than rapid industrialization and economic development, but also social protection, socio-cultural priorities and social service redistribution is vital to a new developmental state. Mkandawire (2007) argues social policy is a vital trait of East Asian developmental states. Social policy is clearly a main feature of social democratic developmental state in Latin America (Evans, 2010; Garcia, 2013). Except development experience in "global south", developmental welfare state is showcase developmental transition in Scandinavian countries. The main priority of Scandinavian is social protection, redistribution of interests, moreover competition in global markets.

Methodology

The developmental state as a notion has based on two critical sociological theory, i.e. the weberian thought on state as rational authority (Weber et al.,1991), and on the neo-Marxists' emphasis on the relative autonomy of the capitalist state (Marx, 1979), so, this notion has been formed as the most contested development approach, and under the perspective of institutionalism and new dependency schools of thinking. The analysis of developmental states as the specific theory-based work drawing from the state as an autonomus institutional body (state-oriented theory), is aimed to provide a transparent and consolidated understanding of causal settings observed in the history of states.

Forethermore, the above table reveals developmental states are notspecific beings cross-linked with geopolitical, cultural and historical in East Asia. Some emerging economies in Latin America, Middle East and Africa, are other options of developmental states as we called *new developmental state* in this research. According to state theorists, the following features is similar to various types of *new developmental states*:

- A political leadership oriented towards development and a core of developmental elites (Johnson, 1982; Leftwich, 2000; Chang, 2010)
 - A capable, autonomous (but embedded) bureaucracy (Evans, 1995; Chang, 2010; Routley, 2012)
 - A close, often mutually beneficial symbiotic relationship between some state agencies (often discussed as pilot agencies) and key industrial capitalists (Johnson, 1982).
 - Successful policy interventions which promote growth (Wade, 1990; Beeson, 2004; Routley, 2012)
 - State embedded autonomy from special interests owners (Johnson, 1982; Evans, 1995; Chang, 2010)
 - Control of economic resources via state (Johnson, 1982; Evans, 1995; Beeson, 2004) and conduct of industries under competition in global marlet
 - Successful Policy Interventions (Wade, 1990; Routley, 2012)
 - Developmental nationalism and national project /legitimacy upon development goals (Haggard et al., 1997; Leftwich, 2000)
 - Developmental militaries (Tilly, 1975(a); Waldner, 1999; Alvez, 2000; Kohli, 2004)
 - Weak and government made civil society (Leftwich, 2000; Chang, 2010)
 - Protectionist social policy (Mkandawire, 2007; Evans, 2010; Sandbrook et al., 2007)

As state-oriented theorists (Skocpol, 1979) argues Historical-Comparative Research is the most appropriate method, since it combines research strategies, namely, *nominal comparison*(an explanation of causes a unique sequel by the elimination of any potencial circumstance) and *narrative comparison* or *tracking process*(to percept the occurrence process or to trace the causal sequence of a chain of events) (Taleban, 2009).

Among the several characteristics of the new developmental states (for more details please see: Johnson, 1982; Leftwich, 2000; Chang, 2010; Evans, 1995; Chang, 2010; Routley, 2012; Johnson, 1982; 1987; Wade, 1990; Beeson, 2004; Routley, 2012; Haggard et al.,1997; Leftwich, 2000; Tilly, 1975(a); Waldner, 1999; Alvez, 2000; Kohli,2004; Mkandawire, 2007; Evans, 2010; Sandbrook et al., 2007) there are seven features that make a good context in order to compare Iran, Turkey, Brasil and Malaysia which are:

1. developmentalist elites,
2. the nationalism to develeopment,
3. developmentalist militias,
4. developmentalist beurucracy,
5. state embedded autonomy,
6. the weak civil society
7. the state capacity of economic resource controls.

Results

Developmental state has two traits, ideological and structural. Ideologically, developmental states insisting economic development throwgh accumulation of capital and rapid industrialization. Structurally, such states insisting empowerment of government for effective implementation of economic policies. The above traits provided that appropriate international context and developmental elites agency, can reconstract a diverse range of developmental states. It can even be claimed *new developmental states*(Turkey, Brazil,Malaysia, South Africa and so on) emerging within evolving geo-political-economic at the beginning of the third millennium, and therefore are comparable each other.

To prove the above claim, let's start with Brazil. Brazil is showcase the developmental state tranferability beyond East Asia. An emerging economy that has taken strides regarding the role of the South in the international economy. As Garcia (2013) argues Brazil social developmental state is a pioneer model in latin America; because legal and socio-economical reforms in Brazil's leftist government after 2002 to a large extent been that named new developmentalism. Also, Evans classifies as an intermediate state (Evans, 1995) and 21th

century developmental state (Evans, 2010). This being is committed to human capabilities development, increased infrastructures, growth education and health and activity in international markets. In addition, 21st century developmental state or capability enhancing developmental state play a crucial role in association with state-society relations for paving the way for increasing the efficiency of the private sector.

Brazil developmental experience is different profoundly with central core of East Asia regarding social origins of development, a civil society affected by leftist governments in Latin America, colonial historical features, dependent development connected to capitalist cores, Tradition of military rule, the type of bureaucracy, and the model of developmental federalism. Nevertheless, according to openness in international markets is added to industrial countries and due to developmental states transferability in geographical regions beyond East Asia, Brazil is showcase of a new developmental state.

On the other hand, Malaysia is an exceptional case in Southeast Asia. Development experts Believe that appropriate policies global opportunities in Malaysia are change agents in this country, especially in the era of Mahathir Mohammad (1981-2003). As Wong (2004) argues Southeast Asian countries such as South Korea, China, Malaysia and so on are Adaptive Developmental States because have succeeded in confronting with exogenous economic pressures such as the end of the Cold War, the onset of economic globalization, and positive trends toward democratic deepening in Asia. Hayashi (2010) and Chang (2010) is typified Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia as South Asian Developmental States (See: Routley, 2012) in order to differentiated between this states and as "The Big Three"(Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) in features such as bureaucratic power and economic growth.

Despite that the Cold War geopolitical context created opportunities of reliance on private capital and rapid industrialization in Malaysia; but there are some qualitative and substantive differences between Malaysia and other East Asian countries.

Malaysia is categorized much lower than Japan and South Korea regarding continued economic growth and bureaucratic power. Furthermore, social, educational and cultural institutions of Malaysia are affected by British colonial experience That differed from South Korea and Taiwan under the influence Japanese colonialism and Eastern rational order. Furthermore, Malaysia is a multi-ethnic and multi-culture society and rich natural resources creates more different routes for the country's development. In addition, muslim-majority have taken social institutions in the historical development after independence and Malaysia has become a unique non-Buddhist model in Southeast Asia. Malaysian historical experience as a new developmental state relying on ethnical-cultural diversity, the impact of colonial institutions and recomposition of nationalities in economic role, can comparable to Iran and Turkey.

Without a doubt, Turkey is a new developmental state model in Middle East. To percept the distinctive features of Turkey, we should be traced that's historical evolution from Kemalist statism to market trends and enterprise activities post- World War II. Particularly, in Özal Administration(1983-1993) and export growth strategy and market forces relying led to industrial infrastructures making. Turkish economist, Rodrik (2004) argues regarding democratization trends in Middle East and Africa, Turkey is a social developmental state model because in this model democracy and social values are more attendance with economic growth and poverty reduction.

Among new developmental states, Turkey is a unique case. Unlike majority of developmental states with colonial origins, that is a dependent formation at 19th - first quarter of 20th century that never colonized, like Iran. From the beginning Republic of Turkey, militaries have been a main interest group and provided conditions for economic development and Islamists government. Like many countries with military backgrounds, Turkish bureaucratic model has highly different with East Asian model. Nevertheless, the main features of Turkish modern state is Continuing a strong tradition of entrepreneurship with a focus on small and medium enterprises.

If assume Iran as a new developmental state in Middle, we should understanding the process of it's state-oriented development and historical modernization. The Iranian modernization trend since Qajar era (The mid-nineteenth century) had the authoritarian essence, and Qajar state played a main role in embarking of that trend. Also, Iranian people since their first endeavour for reaching to the development a state-oriented and elitist attitude assuming that development agent is state and it's power to change. Furthermore, the critical role of state in Iran during the Pahlavi Era (1925-1941) top-down modernization, and specially during the state developmentalism and economic reform-restructuring trend in post-war Iran after 1990s decade, is the manifestation of "developmentalism" on the basis of state agency.

Although some Iranian scholars (Nabavi, 2011) have categorized the Pahlavi I,II states (1925-1978) as a developmental states, and some Others have compared Iranian post-war (it refers to the Iran-Iraq war, *Holly Defense* in Persian) states as developmental states with some similarities with East Asian countries (Delforouz, 2014) but, This study emphasis that the main features of developmental states, including, developmentalist elites, developmentalist bureaucracy, and control of economic resources via state are *absent* in contemporary Iran development process.

The *absence* of above features describe why even with the overwhelming presence of the given trends like Pahlavi's state-building that has been emerged from a 19th dependent formation, state-building continuity in

post-revolutionary Iran, the presence of a developmental militia groups, and economic pragmatism of a state owning all the natural resources; yet a new developmental state has not been flourished, instead we face with the unique formation of beurucracy and authoritarianism that is made during 20th in Iran.

Table 2. Typology of Brazil, Malaysia, Turkey and Iran as *New Developmental State*.

State	Features	Absent/Present of features	Absent/Present of new developmental state
Brazil	1-the role of elites in policy economy and business (DiCaprio & Vehmaan-Kreula, 2009) 2-the elite leadership in brazil (Garcia, 2009) 3-industrial-business elites and Connecting Brazil with global capital (Amsden et al., 2009)	developmentalist elites	+
	1-nativist nationalism in 19 th century (Freyre & Cleary, 2002) 2- expansionist and goal-oriented nationalism (Sachs et al., 2009) 3- particularistic and protectionist Economic Nationalism (Valores, 2012)	the nationalism to deveelopment	+
	1-type of dependent development in Brazil (Cardoso & Enzo, 1979) 2- militaries and Cohesive-capitalist state (Kohli, 2004) 3-military leaders and Reform from above (Hagopian & Mainwaring, 1987)	developmentalist militias	+
	1-A capable,embedded economic bureaucracy (Dasandi, 2014) 2-BNDE(Banque Nationale de Developpement Economique) As a pilot agenciy in Brazil (Evans, 1995) 3-a state beurucratic model in Brazil (Kohli, 2001)	developmentalist beurucracy	+
	1-Mining industry as a basis of State embedded autonomy (Evans, 1995) 2-a cooperation between Civilian economy and social elites as underlying cause for state participattion in infrastructure-industrial projects (Burton & Stevens, 2008) 3-“local states”as government independence factor for action in the international financial markets (Mullins & Murphy, 2008)	State embedded autonomy	+
	1-Brazilian civil society linked in state,society and market (Avritzer, 2009) 2- Market dominance over civil society because of function Brazilian integrated-globalized state (REOS, 2013)	The weak civil society	+
	1- active economic diplomacy and development-oriented foreign policy (Fakheri & Azimi, 2014) 2-local entreoreneurship and a network business making (Daumal & Özyurt, 2011) 3-Brazilian state activity among global and	the state capacity of economic resource controls	+

local capital (Arbix & Martin, 2010)				
Malaysia	1-the elite leadership through stabilization of Malay nationalists and Chinese community (Case, 1996) 2-Look East Policy (Delforouz, 2014) and the importance of Asian values to Malaysian elites 3- The alliance between bureaucratic and private sector elites after Mahathir Mohamad	developmentalist elites	+	
	1- a modern “national” projection from a post-colonial multi-ethnic society (Suryadinata, 2003) 2-the government Islamization as a nation-building ideology (Khalili & Daneshmandi, 2014) 3- the stabilization function of civic and economic in Malaysian development discourse (Shamsul, 1997)	the nationalism to development	+	
	1-the Malaysian industrialization without military participation (Evans, 1995) 2-forming of a authoritarian state and a particular parliamentary Malaysian model that is committed civic values (Shirzadi, 2010)	developmentalist militias	–	
	1- bureaucracy as development and social change agent (Hosseini, 2008) 2-the existence of pilot agencies in Malaysia (Leftwich, 2000) 3-a Weberian bureaucracy with less autonomy than “The Big Three”(Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) in East Asia (Routley, 2012)	developmentalist bureaucracy	+	+
	1-An interventionist, autonomous state in primary stages of Malaysian development in 1970s (Khalili & Daneshmandi, 2012) 2-government autonomous in Malaysia from Worker, Landed and Capitalist classes (Delforouz, 2014) 3-developmental roles (Midwifery and Husbandry) through Malaysian state (Evans, 1995)	State embedded autonomy	+	
	1-authoritarian media model; the extension of Asian values to legitimization of government control on local civil activists (Mohammad, 2011) 2-the emerging of civil society in a post-colonial and multi-ethnic society is dependent on state (Farouk, 2011)	The weak civil society	+	
	1-Malaysia as state that Providing stabilizing conditions for market activities (Leftwich, 2000) 2- Economic regionalism and bilateral relationship political power and economic development (Feizi, 2008) 3-commitment of entrepreneurial state on SMEs development (Mighati, 1998)	the state capacity of economic resource controls	+	

Turkey	1-Modernization, strong government and emerging of military elites (Dreher, 2009) 2-the relationship between Kamalist elites and beurucrates (Adnan & Caroline, 2013) 3-bussiness, industrial elites (Anatolian Tigers) are connected new Islamism and Özal economic reform in 1980s (Fuler, 2004; Mosalla Nejad & Akbari, 2012)	developmentalist elites	+	
	1-Turkish nationalism as inevitable outcome of international historical events have had a anticolonial and linguistic-ethnic essence beginning Republic of Turkey (Azarian, 2011) 2-increasing integration Islam and Conservatism in formal nationalism of Turkish state in Militalian Era (1970-1980s) (Tahaei, 2001) 3-the adding civic and economic elements to Turkish nationalism in Öza and AKP Era	the nationalism to deveopment	+	
	1-the role of Army in Independence Turkey and militaries significane above other institutions in Years after Independence (Capezza, 2009; Karpas, 1970) 2- the role of Army in market economy made in Turkey (Athary, 1999) throwth“enlighed Islam” as a social motive for development projects (Tahaei, 2001)	developmentalist militias	+	
	1-beurucacy as modernization agent in Turkey (Al Atas, 1998) 2-The State Programing Organization as a Pilot Agency (Baradaran shoraka, 2008) and creator of enterprise networks in contemporary Turkey	developmentalist beurucacy	+	
	1- the capitalism making in a Dependent Formation at 19 th century as state autonomy in Turkey (Al Atas, 1998) 2- relative autonomy in Turkey at 1980-19990s because of reinforcement of private sector (Adnan & Caroline, 2013) 3- state autonomy in SMEs protection (Bugra, 1994)	State embedded autonomy	+	
	1-state-made civil society and Strong Government in Turkey (Toprak, 2001) 2-“Negative Attitude”against Civic,media organizations (Kalaycio, 2005) 3- the state consolidation versus public sphere in multi-cultural Turkish society.	The weak civil society	+	
	1- Turkey as state that providing stabilizing conditions for market activities in a competetive economy (Polat, 2011) 2- Economic regionalism and active economic diplomacy (Bayar, 1996) 3-the expanding of entrepreneurship with consideration to small and medium industries.	the state capacity of economic resource controls	+	
	1-The failuring of Pahlavi Era elites in structural change because of totalitarian politics and unbalanced state economy (Shahramnia & Eskandari, 2010) 2-“ Transformation Process” of Islamic	developmentalist elites	-	-

Republic of Iran under government elites agency (Ghomeshi, 2011) 3- Non-formation of a consensus within the elites upon socio-economic development and plurality of power centers in Iran (Delforouz, 2014)			
1-nationalism in 19th century Iran as Reaction to expansionist politics of european contries 2-Iran-Iraq War as a significant source of nationalism in Iran (Farhamy, 2011) 3-A nationalism composed of cultural, ethnical and religious elements in a post-revelutionary society (Aghaie & Marashi, 2014) 4-a particularistic economic nationalism in Iranian Post-war states (1990s)	the nationalism to deveelopment	+	
1-Pahlavi Era militarism; economic development throwth militaries role-making (Chaman kar, 2010) 2-militaries pragmatism linked in beurucratic institutions at Post-war Iran 3- militaries as a main interest group in Iranian economy (Haque, 1997)	developmentalist militias	-	
1- Power Shifting from above and a transformationist beurucracy formation in Reza Shah's reign (Al Atas, 1998) 2- Iran Management and Planning Oranization is not a participatory and decentralized Pilot Agency (Waterson, 1969) 3-the difference of Iranian beurucratic structurs from East Asian Weberian beurucracy (Delforouz, 2014) and state-beucracy disfunction in Belief system of the Islamic Republic of Iran	developmentalist beurucracy	-	
1- Power Shifting from above and a autonomous beucracy formation in Reza Shah's reign (Al Atas, 1998) 2-a rentier state autonomy in Mohammad Reza Shah's reign (Mahdavi, 1970; Alizadeh, 2014) 3- State embedded autonomy continuing versus classes(Worker, Landed and Capitalist) after Islamic Republic of Iran (Delforouz, 2014) due to pre-state capitalism reproduction	State embedded autonomy	+	
1- Constitutional Revolution in the late Qajar Iran and expansion of civil society 2- Contraction and expansion of civil society in Pahlavi Era affected by a retoier state (Haji Usefi, 1998, 2008) 3-a civil society dominated by the government in the Post-War Iran	The weak civil society	+	
1- Ineffectiveness of government policies in providing facilities to market and private sector conducting (Derakhshan & Mehr ara, 2004) 2- Inefficiency of Iranina State in link entrepreneurs with local and international	the state capacity of economic resource controls	-	

markets (Razaghi, 1993)
 3-failing to connection global and local
 capital

Discussion and Conclusion

Theoretically, developmental state as a notion has based on two critical sociological theory, i.e. the weberian thought on state as rational authority (Weber et al., 1991), and on the neo-Marxists' emphasis on the relative autonomy of the capitalist state (Marx, 1979), so, this notion has been formed as the most contested development approach, and under the perspective of institutionalism and new dependency schools of thinking.

Geopolitically, the emergence of central core of East Asia and *new developmental state* have been interlocked rapid extension of the global capitalist economy to periphery of "world-system". Brazil, Malaysia, Turkey- The main features of new developmental states are *absent* in Iran (See:table 2)- can be explained as *new developmental states* refer to transferability- the logic of states transition in "interstate system"- and historical-structural trends of NDSs. Global trends, capital dynamic and world-system logic, determined *new developmental states* as the most recent formations of "semi-peripheral development".

Figure 1 represents transitions of the developmental states. As Figure 1 highlights, the classic developmental states was emerged in "core" of world- system after 1870s. Affected by some specific historical events during 1870s decade, including, the Prussian Empire Conquest over Napoleon III, and the beginning of Meiji Reforms in Japan (Kazemi, 2015); the classic developmental state was emerged and evolved. The CDSs represent development experience in Germany and Japan (1870-1914) as criteria of accelerated development and rapid industrialization.

The aftermath of World War II, formation of Eastern Bloc, and finally, beginning the Cold War, all together, transferred the geographical field of developmental states to the East Asia (the *beurucatic* developmental states). The developmental *beurucatic* states ,as born of Cold War conditions, is shaped in "periphery" of World System in East Asia. Although, developmental *beurucatic* states is different in form and content with classics such as Germany and Japan; but there is no differ between them in government-driven development experience. The experience that affected by Post-War international stracturs and geographical, cultural and social contexts of central core of East Asia.

Thaiwan, South Korea, Singapre have passed colonial experience, land reform, institutional reform from 1945-1970 and have had features of developmental state, such as the *beurucatic* order based on Eastern values, the rapid industrialization preference to social-redistribution policies, the leadership of elites, collective values versus individualism, and state autonomy. Of course, in the era after World War II, developmental network state have been another possible route (See: Figure 1) in DSs evolution from a different context and trent.

Since 1990s decade till now, international trends and contexts like, globalization, the end of Cold War, and East Asian financial crisis, have provided necessary conditions to Transfer of DSs Model to the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. The global socio-economic environment change along with the pressure to the democratization have introduced "Global South" (Turkey, South Africa and Brazil and so on) as the recent cases of developmental states. As well as, the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and entering the Post-Cold War era as a determinative variable have created Post-socialist Developmental State in China and so on. Just like former generation of DSs, *new developmental states* (NDSs) are effected by geopolitical determinators and their cultural, social, and historical trends:

First, NDSs is different colonial experience with compare East Asia. The former colonies of Japan, named Developmental *beurucatic* states or the Central Core of East Asia, are created interlocked to Core of World System (US), regarding continuous expansion of the capitalist world economy. At the beginning of the third millennum, it seems interlocked conditions have extended refer to the fundamental dynamics of globalization. Thus, non-colonial formations in Middle East such as Turkey[and Iran] have added NDSs. Moreover, the former colonies in Latin America and Africa are other models of NDSs. It is clear that colonial experiences of this counties are deeply differed with East Asia, regarding to diversity of developmental institutions, democratic structures, the priority of socio-cultural values in development and so on.




Figure 1. Evolutional Framework of Developmental State.

Second, beurucratic formations in NDSs is more different than the central core of East Asia. Against Weberian rational beurucracies in East Asia that have been established upon Eastern order and ethic values; developmental beurucracies in Latin America e.g. Brazil and Middle East e.g. Turkey have created from varied militaristic traditions.

Third, the pressure to democratization and the priority of social development indexes, have determined social developmental democratic state in South Africa, Brazil and so on. not only social developmental democratic states e.g. South Africa have embedded to economic relations and powery decline, but also emerged from the social origins. In addition, we should highlight democratization trends in Middle East e.g. Turkey and Iran; the difference that democratic traditions and values in South Africa is presistent than modern satates of Middle East.

Forth, social policy is another significant trend in NDSs that have been concern to welfare services. A race to the bottom toward social goals, the embeddedness of development projects in social system, the social protectionism in accumulation and distribution of capital, and finally, investement in human resource, infrastructures, and market development are the main priorities of "21th century developmental state" in Brazil, India, South Africa.

Finally, state activism between global and local capital, the extension of SMEs, and state entrepreneurship is a major trend among most NDSs e.g. Brazil, India, Turkey, and even Iran. The expanding power of global capitalism and increasing integration of local economies in transnational global economy, have linked with risk capital. Under these circumstances, entrepreneurs' protection and state-society synergy reinforcement are vital necessities among NDSs.

Johnson (1982) defined Japanese developmental state as a state that is focused on economic development and the priority of rapid industrialization rather than social values. According to the definition there isn't substantive differences between *new developmental states* and East Asia countries. But according to geopolitical reasoning, have made important distinctions between them.

So that shows the above trends, have increased geographical scope and functional differentiation of *new developmental states* in global environment. As far as, it seems recent and diverse types of NDSs have less structural similarities to former generation of developmental states. In other words, current globalized space has crushed developmental state through the fluidity of capital, decentralization of structure, sources and elements of power, the creation of social networks-chains and so on.

Thus, DSs are extended, regionally and functionally, to other countries e.g. Brazil, Turkey and Malaysia so-called NDSs. Although, the main features of NDSs are absent in Iran; nevertheless like other samples in this research, is formed in a particular historical-structural context and, regarding to government-oriented development, is similar to other NDSs.

Conflict of interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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